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What next for Egypt? 
If there was ever a better time to read ‘Egypt: The Moment of Change’, a book edited by Rabab El Mahdi and Philip Marfleet which was launched in front of a packed audience at SOAS in 2009, then it is now. Made up of chapters by eight Egyptian and British 
academics, it catalogues the explosive situation which has existed in North Africa’s most populous country for many years. ‘Egypt: 
The Moment of Change’ highlights problems including social injustice and governmental corruption. It also focuses on the way 
capitalist interests backed up by the security state have subjugated workers’ interests at the grassroots. Islamism and the standing 
of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s President, in the world are also, of course, considered. The conclusion of the book is a pertinent ‘What 
Next?’ Dr. El Mahdi, who co-directed the work, warned that the most dangerous time would be the ‘moment of change’ when 
Mubarak’s regime starts to crumble under the weight of inherent contradictions accumulated over three decades in power. We are 
now witnessing that moment. 
A day after deposed Tunisian President Ben Ali fled his own country, I made the following assessment regarding the geopolitical 
fallout of the Tunisian uprising: ‘[a] domino effect in Egypt seems plausible in a presidential election year and in a country where 
the ingredients for an uprising are all there waiting only for them to reach their critical mass and a trigger event. The bogus way 
in which the parliamentary elections were run two months ago, when the overwhelming majority of seats were won by the ruling 
party, totally excluding the Muslim Brotherhood (who had won 88 seats in the 2005 elections) and other parties have contributed 
to the build-up of frustration among Egyptians’. 
Back in Egypt, it took four days of mass street protests to 
force Mubarak’s regime to make its first concession. In a 
speech, the President promised reforms, jobs, and social 
justice, including the designation of Omar Suleiman, head 
of the Intelligence Service, as vice president (a position 
Mubarak had in fact got rid of when he came to power 
in 1981). General Ahmed Shafik was appointed Prime 
Minister. Yesterday, it emerged that the retired General 
Mahmoud Wagedi had been nominated Interior Minister. 
Giving these three men top positions as well as announcing 
the resignation of Ahmed Ezz, steel industry tycoon, from 
the membership of the National Democratic Party’s Political 
Bureau did nothing to appease the protesters, however. 
It could have worked two years ago when Suleiman and 
Shafik’s distinguished military careers still commanded 
respect among Egyptians. But the timing and context 
of their new appointments eroded any credibility they might have had. Egyptians responded with the slogan ‘The people want to 
topple the regime!’, a chant originally heard in Tunisia just before Ben Ali’s regime fell. In Egypt, key figures including El Baradei and 
the Nobel Prize laureate Ahmed Zeweil considered the appointments as a ‘militarisation’ of the state. 
A night curfew was declared last Friday in the three main cities of Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez. The turning point in the protests came 
when the curfew was declared: it shattered what little remained of the regime’s authority. Internationally it weakened the regime’s 
credibility. A regime which cannot impose a curfew in its capital city conveys an image of weakness and, indeed, disintegration. 
Then the Egyptian Army was deployed nationally because the police forces had lost control of the situation. 
Even after what happened in Tunisia, the Egyptian disturbances caught most foreign observers, including governments, by surprise. 
Washington revised its position four times - shifting from an initial assurance by Hilary Clinton, Secretary of State, that the Mubarak 
regime was stable on Tuesday, to a more nuanced - almost neutral - position by the weekend. By this time, the U.S. was calling for 
an ‘orderly transition’ of power to form a broad-based government. While all this was happening, vice-President Joe Biden made a 
major gaffe on live TV by saying he failed to think of Mubarak as a dictator because of the regime’s important role in the geopolitics 
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of the region. Biden is now being likened in the Arab world to 
the French foreign affairs minister Michele Alliot-Marie, who 
made a pro-Ben Ali speech in Parliament just before the Jasmine 
Revolution in Tunisia. Norway was in fact the only country to 
formulate a clear position supporting the Egyptian protesters, 
whilst other western countries lined up behind the US’s formally 
ambivalent position. 
From Brussels, Catherine Ashton has called on Egypt ‘to release 
immediately all peaceful demonstrators who are in detention’, 
and open dialogue with the opposition. Understandably, Arab 
capitals maintained a deafening silence about what was going on 
in Egypt while Arabs from Rabat to Riyadh continue to be glued 
to Al Jazeera , watching the worsening situation. After removing 
internet and mobile phone networks in Egypt, Mubarak’s regime 
decided on the sixth day of the protests to shut down Al Jazeera’s 
bureaus in the country. The government has now withdrawn its 
journalists’ press cards, and indeed removed the news channel 
from the crucial Nilesat satellite. 
Unlike Tunisia, where US strategic interests were almost non-
existent, Egypt plays a pivotal role in Washington’s Middle East 
policy. For Israel a change in regime in Egypt might threaten its 
gas supplies across the north of Sinai, where Tel Aviv is buying 
Egyptian gas at preferential prices., Over the past three years, this 
issue has caused divisions even among supporters of Mubarak’s 
regime. Moreover, Israel’s strategic alliance with Turkey has been 
profoundly damaged in the aftermath of the Gaza flotilla debacle. 
Israel cannot afford to lose another strategic partner in the region, 
least of all Mubarak’s regime. There is a deep concern in Tel Aviv, 
as is made clear in statements from Israeli politicians and ranking 
military officers. As far as the business community is concerned, 
there is justifiable panic in Wall Street, the City of London, and 
the Gulf stock exchanges. Increasing instability around the Suez 
Canal is just one of the problems which have led to a sharp hike 
in oil prices, as well as other commodities which are transported 
through the Canal.
The protests in Egypt certainly present American foreign policy 
advisers with a major headache. These demonstrations have 
involved all sections of society, including informal grassroots 
movements like the 6 April Youth movement, Kefaya Enough!, 
supporters of Mohamed El Baradei, and other protest groups 
formed over the last five years or so through Facebook and other 
social networking sites. Also present is the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The latter group, in particular, has left Washington confused 
as to how best to respond to a situation dominated by events 
on the street, rather than in the corridors of power in Cairo or 
Washington. So far around 150 people have been killed in the 
Egyptian disturbances, and 4,000 injured in the space of just over 
a week. There is a consensus among key opposition figures now 
that Mubarak should abdicate, dissolve parliament, and form a 
broad-base salvation government to draft a new constitution to 
form the basis of the next presidential elections. 
Beyond such considerations, the US is concerned about the 
presence of the Muslim Brotherhood. It has kept a relatively low 
profile throughout the protests and they have agreed to line up, 
together with other political groups, behind El Baradei to engage in 
transition talks with the Mubarak regime. The fact that the Muslim 
Brotherhood has kept low profile throughout the protests disarms 
both the regime and Washington from their stability vs. Islamists 
cliché. As thousands of protestors continue to pour into Tahrir 
Square in Cairo and other cities two significant developments 
have taken place. First, the army issued a communiqué in which 
it recognised ‘the legitimacy of the demands of the protesters’ 
and guaranteed peaceful protest would not be met with violence. 
Secondly, the army’s communiqué was followed by a speech by 
Omar Suleiman, vice-President, in which he called for dialogue 
with the opposition and instructed judges to reconsider fraud 
charges regarding the recent parliamentary elections, with the 
aim of holding fresh elections in the constituencies concerned. 
The army’s communiqué has been interpreted as a tacit support 
for the demonstrators and has encouraged more people to come 
out defying the curfew even further. As for the vice-President’s 
speech it is clear that the regime has made another concession. 
‘Too little too late’ is the refrain from Tahrir Square. But one should 
not fail to notice the fact that it was Suleiman who made the 
speech and not Mubarak , as was the case in the first speech 
since the turmoil started last Tuesday. Meanwhile, Frank Wisner, 
US former ambassador to Cairo (1986-91) has arrived in Cairo to 
engage transition negotiations. Abd Al Jawad, director of the Al 
Ahram Strategic Studies Centre, declared shortly after the two 
communiqués that ‘Mubarak’s era is over and a new legitimacy 
represented by Omar Suleiman is underway’. 
Protestors seem determined to topple the regime and their 
numbers have grown despite the extended seventeen-hour 
curfew. The regime has been betting that the protests’ momentum 
would be weakened gradually but it seems it has to reconsider 
its assessment. One thing is sure, we are already in a transition 
mood, in that any succession plans for Gamal Mubarak are now 
put to rest. Mubarak himself knew it was over when he appointed 
a vice-President; we will not witness a spectacular ouster like the 
Ben Ali scenario. In the several months from now until September, 
when his term ends, vice-President Suleiman is likely to seek to 
consolidate his role as the acting head of the state, ensuring an 
honourable exit for Mubarak in September, when his term ends, 
unless demonstrations force the army to pressure Mubarak to 
resign from his duties more precipitously on medical and age 
grounds. But for now all are holding their breath while foreign 
governments and companies started evacuating their citizens 
and personnel. ‘What next for Egypt?’ may be decided today 
in Tahrir Square just as was the case in 1919 Revolution from 
the very same square, hence the significance of the symbolism. 
Mubarak is surely gone, who is next remains to be seen.
